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This is a very interesting and unusual book, in so far as it applies the lens of populism not to individual parties or party families, but to a coalition of three parties of the right which have dominated Italian politics since the collapse of the First Republic in the early 1990s. The authors begin by defining populism as a 'weak ideology' (p. 57), which, compared with others, 'has a smaller less specific core, and this makes it adaptable' (p. 55). Through a 'frame analysis' (whose techniques are fully explained in an Appendix) of key documents produced since 1994 by the three parties, Lega Nord,Forza Italia and Alleanza Nazionale, Ruzza and Fella are able to identify both their 'core' and 'peripheral' features.
They come to the conclusion that, while the three parties differ substantially in terms of their origins, trajectories and electoral constituencies, they share core features of populism, consisting of 'a distinct configuration of ideas, styles and policies' (p. 186). In terms of ideas, the core elements are defined as 'the tendency towards charismatic leadership, appeals to the people, and anti-politics' (p. 186). In terms of style, the parties share a 'choice of language which indicates anti-elitism, vilification of enemies and homogeneity of the constituency' (p. 186). In terms of policies, the authors stress 'symbolic policies': 'policies intended to symbolise and justify dynamics of inclusion and exclusion—the adoption of these policies constitutes a quasi-tribal form of politics…. Populism would then include the use of Edelman-style symbolic politics to show allegiance to one's “people”' (p. 61).
The book, however, offers much more than an identification of core and peripheral features of populism on the basis of a systematic empirical analysis. It also examines the ways in which the three parties have successfully been able to reinvent the right in Italy, following the collapse of Christian Democracy (hence its title). The authors explain this process of reinvention with reference to both political and discursive opportunity structures, and by assessing the fit between the ideas and values put forward by these parties and the values subscribed to by the Italian electorate, as measured by various surveys. By doing so, the authors show the reader how populism works in practice and how it can provide a very effective tool for interpreting the values and feelings of the electorate (especially its fears and anxieties) at times marked by 'epochal changes' (p. 213). The book also demonstrates how different types of populism can not only coexist, but also reinforce each other.
Inevitably, given the scope of the volume, some areas are left somewhat underexplored. One of these areas concerns the behaviour of populist parties in government and above all what the authors term 'symbolic policies'. It seems clear from their analysis that, at least in the period 2001-06, the right-wing coalition in Italy failed to introduce radical new policies; indeed in terms of policy-making the performance of the Berlusconi government was fairly modest. In part, this was due to the internal divisions within the coalition, but it was also due to the symbolic use of many policies.
This raises a number of questions, which are only touched upon by the authors: Why do populist parties privilege the symbolic aspect of policy-making? Why does the electorate not get tired of being promised sweeping changes which are then not delivered? What does this tell us more widely about policy-making in the age of globalisation and Europeanisation? Or is Italy an exception in Europe? The Italian case offers a fairly unique opportunity to study the behaviour of populist parties in government, but I feel that the authors have only partially exploited this opportunity.
A second area I would highlight concerns the attribution of a populist character to all three parties under consideration. This seems uncontroversial as regards the Lega Nord and Forza Italia, but it is more problematic in relation to Alleanza Nazionale. The authors themselves acknowledge this, and consider the latter party as having gradually moved away from a populist ideology and style, although they argue that it still shows visible traces of both. While the authors' assessment of this party is convincing, and they are able to outline some context-specific reasons for its trajectory, they could have explored in greater depth the factors that lead parties to move away from populism. This analysis would have complemented the explanation of the reasons why parties embrace populism, which is given prominence in the book.
On balance, however, the many strengths of this volume far outweigh any criticisms that can be raised. By combining a clearly developed theoretical framework with in-depth empirical analysis based on appropriate methodology, it makes important contributions to our understanding of contemporary Italian politics, populism and populist parties, and the state of European democracy, and is a 'must read' for both students and scholars interested in these issues.
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